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Abstract
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent
receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post infor-
mation rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post
information. When the agent’s ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive,
whereas they are zero in continuous models. Consequently, full disclosure of ex post in-
formation is generally suboptimal. Optimal disclosure rules trade off the benefits from
adapting the allocation to better information against the effect that more information ag-
gravates truth-telling.
Keywords: information rents, sequential screening, information disclosure
JEL codes: D82, H57
∗University Bonn, Department of Economics, Institute for Microeconomics, Adenauer Allee 24-42, D-53113
Bonn (Germany), kraehmer@hcm.uni-bonn.de.
†Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Institute for Economic Theory 1, Spandauer Str. 1, D-10178 Berlin (Ger-
many), strauszr@wiwi.hu-berlin.de. We thank Peter Esö, Philipp Kircher, R. Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Pavan,
Balazs Szentes, and seminar audiences at Bocconi, Bonn, CESIfo Munich, Florence, Yale. We gratefully acknowl-
edge financial support by the DFG (German Science Foundation) under SFB/TR-15 and SFB649.
1
1 Introduction
Economic theory recognizes that private information is a crucial determinant of economic
inefficiencies. In adverse selection models where a principal faces a privately informed agent
at the contracting stage, such as in monopolistic price discrimination (e.g, Baron and Myerson,
1982) or public procurement (e.g. Laffont and Tirole, 1986), the agent’s private information
forces the seller to concede information rents to the agent. As a result, a trade–off between
rent extraction and efficiency emerges which leads to economic inefficiencies.
In contrast, Harris and Raviv (1978) show that, when the agent’s private information
arrives only ex post, after the agent’s decision to participate in the relationship, this trade-off
between rent extraction and efficiency does not emerge: the principal can extract the full
surplus from the relation without leaving rents to the agent.1 Esö and Szentes (2007a, b)
extend this result to a framework where the agent receives both ex ante and ex post private
information. In particular, they decompose the agent’s final information into a piece that
arrives ex ante and a piece that arrives ex post and is independent of the ex ante information.
This formulation identifies the agent’s ex post information with the additional information,
also referred to as the “shock”, that he receives beyond the information he already has ex
ante. In this setting, Esö and Szentes (2007a, b) show that at the optimal mechanism, the
agent’s private knowledge of the shock does not add to the information rents that he receives
already from his ex ante information.2 These results suggest the general insight that only ex
ante private information is a source of information rents, whereas ex post private information
is not.
The purpose of this paper is to qualify this insight and to offer a more comprehensive
perspective of the role of private ex post private information in dynamic adverse selection
problems. Our main contribution is to show that the insight of Harris and Raviv (1978) that
the principal can extract all rents from ex post private information extends only to models
in which the agent’s ex ante private information is smooth and continuous such as Esö and
Szentes (2007a,b). In contrast, the principal has to concede a strictly positive information rent
for extracting the agent’s ex post information when the agent’s ex ante private information
1This holds in a framework with quasi–linear preferences where the agent is effectively risk neutral.
2This is shown in a setting with two periods and one allocation decision for a single agent by Esö and Szentes
(2007a) and for the case with many agents by Esö and Szentes (2007b). Esö and Szentes (2013) generalizes
the result to a setting with allocation decisions in multiple periods and moral hazard.
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is discrete. In order to demonstrate this result, we provide a formal decomposition of the
agent’s total information rents into a part that accrues from his ex ante information and a
part that accrues from the privacy of the shock. Using this decomposition, we show that, in
general, the seller has to concede to the agent additional rents for eliciting the shock, because
the agent may benefit from coordinating lies about his ex ante information with lies about the
realization of the shock. We show, however, that when the distance between ex ante types
diminishes, the agent’s potential benefits from coordinating his lies tend to zero at a faster
speed than the distance between ex ante types. As a result, marginal ex post information rents
vanish in the limit of a smooth continuous model.3
We further show that, as an implication of our result, full disclosure of ex post informa-
tion is no longer generally optimal when the agent’s ex ante private information is discrete,
whereas, as shown by Esö and Szentes (2007a, b), full disclosure is optimal in continuous
models. We identify two conflicting effects of disclosure. More disclosure is beneficial to the
principal because it allows him to choose among a larger set of allocations, as allocations can
indirectly depend on the agent’s message about the disclosed information. The negative ef-
fect of more disclosure is however that, as already noted in Myerson (1991, p.297), "revealing
more information to players makes it harder to prevent them from finding ways to gain by
lying". The seller’s optimal disclosure rule trades off these two effects.
This paper contributes to the literature on dynamic mechanism design by focusing on the
role of dynamic private information.4 We built on Esö and Szentes’ (2007a, b) approach to
study the relevance of ex post information in models with both discrete and continuous ex
ante information. Next to demonstrating the relevance of ex post information in discrete
models, we provide an alternative proof for their result that ex post information is irrelevant
in continuous models.
Two recent papers are closely related to our partial disclosure result. First, also Li and Shi
(2013) present a partial disclosure result for the standard sequential screening model. The
3That information rents are zero in smooth continuous models is a consequence of the dynamic revenue
equivalence property established in Pavan et al. (2013). When ex ante information is discrete, revenue equiv-
alence fails, opening the door for the possibility that the agent gains from a lie about the shock after an initial
lie.
4E.g., Baron and Besanko (1984), Courty and Li (2000), Battaglini (2005), Esö and Szentes (2007a, b), Hoff-
mann and Inderst (2011), Krähmer and Strausz (2011), Nocke et al. (2011), Pavan et al. (2013), Boleslavsky
and Said (2013), Deb and Said (2013).
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key conceptual difference between our and their result is that Li and Shi (2013) consider more
general disclosure rules. In their framework the seller can disclose any information about the
final payoff type, which is a combination of both the buyer’s initial private information and
the shock. In contrast, we allow partial disclosure only of the shock. The results of Esö and
Szentes (2007a) imply that with continuous type distributions, partial disclosure of the shock
is never strictly optimal. Hence, whereas we show that this is no longer true with discrete
types, Li and Shi (2013) show that partial disclosure may be strictly optimal if it concerns the
final payoff type rather than the shock.
Second, Bergemann and Wambach (2013) provide an additional reason why partial dis-
closure might be optimal. They show for the setting of Esö and Szentes (2007a) that by
only partially disclosing the additional information, i.e., the shock, the seller can relax par-
ticipation constraints without impairing revenue. Hence, if the buyer must not make losses,
conditional on the additional information disclosed, partial disclosure of the shock is optimal.
In contrast, in our setting partial disclosure may be optimal even though the buyer can make
losses ex post, after additional information has been disclosed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the formal model in the next
section. In Section 3, we set up the seller’s problem for the case where the agent’s ex post
information is private and public and discuss how these two problems relate to the question
of ex post information rents. In Section 4, we study the case of two ex ante types and demon-
strate that positive ex post information rents are necessary to prevent coordinated lying. In
Section 5, we study ex post information rents for the general case, distinguishing between
smooth continuous models, where the ex post information rent vanishes, and discrete mod-
els, where it does not. In Section 6 we explain with an explicit example that the seller is
strictly better off by disclosing ex post information only partially rather than fully. Section 7
concludes. All proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
There is a seller (she) and a buyer (he). The seller’s costs to produce the good are commonly
known and normalized to zero. The buyer’s valuation is v and takes values in [v, v]. The
terms of trade are the probability with which the good is sold, x ∈ [0, 1], and a payment t ∈ R
from the buyer to the seller. Parties are risk–neutral and have quasi–linear utility functions.
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That is, under the terms of trade x and t, the seller receives utility t, and the buyer receives
utility vx − t. The seller’s objective is to design a selling mechanism that maximizes her
expected revenue where a selling mechanism specifies the terms of trade, possibly contingent
on communication between the parties.
When the seller offers a mechanism to the buyer, no party knows the true valuation, v,
but the buyer is better informed about the distribution from which v is drawn than the seller.
Formally, it is common knowledge that v is distributed according to the distribution function
F(·|θ ), where θ is drawn from the support Θ ⊆ R with distribution function P. We follow
the literature and assume “non–shifting support”, that is, the support of F(·|θ ) is the interval
[v, v] for all θ ∈ Θ. The distributions {F(v|θ )|θ ∈ Θ} are ranked according to first order
stochastic dominance, that is, θ > θ̂ implies F(v|θ ) < F(v|θ̂ ) for all v ∈ (v, v). We further
assume that the density f (v|θ ) = ∂ F(v|θ )/∂ v exists for each θ ∈ Θ and is bounded away
from zero, i.e., there exists some ǫ > 0 such that f (v|θ ) > ǫ for all v ∈ [v, v] and θ ∈ Θ.
Hence, F(v|θ ) is strictly increasing in v and decreasing in θ .
Before the seller offers the buyer a mechanism, the buyer privately observes the signal
θ so that we interpret θ as the buyer’s ex ante private information. If the buyer accepts the
mechanism, then, before production takes place, v is drawn according to F(·|θ ) and the buyer
observes this realization privately. Because we are interested in the information rent the buyer
can secure from observing additional private information ex post, we need a proper definition
of the buyer’s ex post private information.
It is important to note that while the buyer observes his valuation v ex post, v contains more
than the additional information the buyer receives ex post. Intuitively, the buyer’s additional
information is the “difference” between the information contained in his valuation and his ex
ante information. To capture this formally, we follow the idea of Esö and Szentes (2007a,
b) and write the buyer’s valuation as a compound of ex ante information and additional,
orthogonal ex post information. Define the random variableσ = F(v|θ ). Then σ is uniformly
distributed on the unit interval and is stochastically independent of θ .5 The buyer’s valuation
can be backed out as a function of θ and σ by
v = v(θ ,σ) ≡ F−1(σ|θ ), (1)
where F−1 is the inverse of F with respect to v and exists because F(v|θ ) is strictly increasing
5Note that for all θ , it holds: Prob(σ < σ̄) = F(F−1(σ̄|θ )|θ ) = σ̄.
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in v. Hence, instead of assuming that θ and v is observed, we can equivalently assume that
θ and σ is observed. Because σ is independent of θ , the formulation in terms of θ and σ
allows us to interpret σ as the agent’s (additional) ex post private information. In line with
standard terminology, we also refer to σ as the shock.
Thus we consider the following timing:
1. The buyer privately observes θ .
2. The seller offers a mechanism.
3. The buyer accepts or rejects.
If he rejects, both parties receive their outside option normalized to zero.
4. If the buyer accepts, the buyer privately observes σ.
5. The terms of trade are implemented according to the mechanism.
We now introduce a distinction which will be key for our analysis:
Definition 1 (a) We say that the model is continuous if Θ is an interval [θ ,θ ] and for all
θ ∈ (θ ,θ ):
∂ F(v|θ )
∂ θ
exists and is bounded. (2)
(b) We say that the model is discrete if Θ is a discrete set {θ , . . . ,θ , . . . ,θ}.6
For the case that the model is continuous, our setting is identical to the setup in Esö and
Szentes (2007a, b)7 who show that the privacy of the ex post information σ is irrelevant in
the sense that the seller can fully extract the value of the buyer’s ex post information. The
main point of our paper is to qualify this result for the case that the model is discrete, and
to identify the source of the buyer’s ex post information rent. To make this point, we follow
Esö and Szentes (2007a, b) and compare the optimal selling mechanism when σ is observed
privately by the buyer to the optimal mechanism in the benchmark case when σ is publicly
observable.
6Alternatively, we could equivalently define a discrete model as a model in which Θ is an interval and F(v|θ )
is piece-wise constant in θ . Clearly, then F(v|θ ) would not be differentiable for some θ ∈ Θ and the model
would not be continuous in our sense. We believe that our formulation is more in line with standard practice in
mechanism design.
7Esö and Szentes (2007b) consider the auction case when the seller faces multiple potential buyers. Allowing
for multiple buyers would not change our results.
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In what follows, it will often be more convenient to work with the function v(θ ,σ) rather
than with F(v|θ ). Our assumptions on F(v|θ ) translate directly into the following properties
of v(θ ,σ).
Lemma 1 (a) For all θ > θ̂ :
v(θ ,σ) > v(θ̂ ,σ) ∀σ ∈ (0, 1). (3)
(b) For all θ , θ̂ ∈ Θ and σ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique σ∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that
v(θ̂ ,σ∗) = v(θ ,σ). (4)
(c) For all θ ∈ Θ,σ ∈ (0, 1):
∂ v(θ ,σ)
∂ σ
exists, is strictly positive, and bounded. (5)
(d) If the model is continuous, then for all θ ∈ Θ,σ ∈ (0, 1):
∂ v(θ ,σ)
∂ θ
exists and is bounded. (6)
3 The seller’s problem
In describing the seller’s problem, we begin with the case that the shock σ is the buyer’s
private information, and then describe the case when the shock is publicly observable.
3.1 Private shock
When both ex ante information and the shock are the buyer’s private information, we can
apply the revelation principle for dynamic games (Myerson, 1986) which states that the op-
timal mechanism is in the class of direct and incentive compatible mechanisms. A direct and
incentive compatible mechanism specifies the terms of trade as functions of reports by the
buyer about his ex ante information and the shock and, moreover, induces the buyer, on the
equilibrium path, to report his information truthfully.
Formally, a direct mechanism (x , t) is a combination of an allocation rule x and a transfer
schedule t with
x : Θ× [0, 1]→ [0, 1], t : Θ × [0, 1]→ R (7)
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that requires the buyer to report a message θ̂ ∈ Θ at the outset (before having observed σ)
and to subsequently (after having observed σ) report a message σ̂ ∈ [0, 1]. If a buyer who
has observed θ and σ reports θ̂ and σ̂, his utility from the mechanism is
u(θ̂ , σ̂;θ ,σ) = v(θ ,σ)x(θ̂ , σ̂)− t(θ̂ , σ̂). (8)
With slight abuse of notation, we define the buyer’s utility from truth-telling as u(θ ,σ) =
u(θ ,σ;θ ,σ).
We say the mechanism (x , t) is ex post incentive compatible if it induces the buyer to report
the shock truthfully after having truthfully reported his ex ante information:
u(θ ,σ) ≥ u(θ , σ̂;θ ,σ) ∀θ ,σ, σ̂. (9)
Note that the revelation principle requires truth-telling in the second stage only after truth-
telling in the first stage (see Myerson, 1986). Hence, it might (in fact, it will) be optimal for
the buyer, after he lied about θ to lie also about σ. Thus, the buyer’s expected utility from
reporting θ̂ at the initial stage when he has observed θ is





u(θ̂ , σ̂;θ ,σ) dσ. (10)
The “max” operator under the integral accounts for the fact that the mechanism may induce
the buyer to lie about σ after lying about θ . Again abusing notation, we define the buyer’s
utility from truth-telling at the initial stage as U(θ ) = U(θ ;θ ).
We say that the mechanism is ex ante incentive compatible if it induces the buyer to report
his ex ante information truthfully:
U(θ ) ≥ U(θ̂ ;θ ) ∀θ , θ̂ . (11)
A mechanism (x , t) is incentive compatible with private shock if it is ex ante and ex post incen-
tive compatible.
We also assume that the seller wants to ensure the buyer’s participation in the mechanism,
and therefore the mechanism needs to give the buyer his outside option of zero. A mechanism
is individually rational with private shock if:
U(θ ) ≥ 0 ∀θ . (12)
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A mechanism is feasible with private shock if it is incentive compatible and individually
rational with private shock. We say that the allocation rule x is implementable with private







t(θ ,σ) dσ dP(θ ) s.t. (9), (11), (12) (13)
the principal’s maximal expected revenue from an implementable allocation rule x .
The seller’s problem with private shock, referred to asP , is to choose a feasible mechanism







t(θ ,σ) dσ dP(θ ) s.t. (9), (11), (12). (14)
We refer to a solution to P as (x∗, t∗) and denote the seller’s value from problem P by W ∗.
3.2 Publicly observable shock
When the shock is publicly observable, the only private information of the buyer is his ini-
tial information θ . The revelation principle then implies that the optimal selling mechanism
is a direct and incentive compatible mechanism (x̃ , t̃) which requires the buyer to report a
message θ̂ ∈ Θ about his ex ante information only, and which induces the buyer to report
truthfully. In addition to the buyer’s report, the mechanism can condition directly on the
shock, as it is contractible by assumption.
Formally, if the buyer has observed θ and reports θ̂ at the outset, his expected utility from
the mechanism (x̃ , t̃) is
Ũ(θ̂ ;θ ) =
∫ 1
0
{v(θ ,σ)x̃(θ̂ ,σ)− t̃(θ̂ ,σ)} dσ. (15)
Note that, whatever the buyer’s report θ̂ , the terms of trade are enforced according to the
true value of σ, as now σ does not need to be elicited from the buyer any more. We define,
again with slight abuse of notation, Ũ(θ ) = Ũ(θ ;θ ).
We say that a mechanism (x̃ , t̃) is incentive compatible with public shock if it induces the
buyer to report his initial information truthfully:
Ũ(θ )≥ Ũ(θ̂ ;θ ) ∀θ , θ̂ . (16)
8If Θ is discrete, the integral is to be understood as an integral over the discrete measure P and is thus a sum.
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As before, the seller wants to ensure the buyer’s participation in the mechanism, and there-
fore the mechanism needs to give the buyer his outside option of zero. We say a mechanism
is individually rational with public shock if:
Ũ(θ ) ≥ 0 ∀θ . (17)
A mechanism is feasible with public shock if it is incentive compatible and individually
rational with public shock. We say that the allocation rule x̃ is implementable with public







t̃(θ ,σ) dσ dP(θ ) s.t. (16), (17) (18)
the principal’s maximal expected revenue from an implementable allocation rule x̃ .
The seller’s problem with public shock, referred to as P̃ , is to choose a feasible mechanism







t̃(θ ,σ) dσ dP(θ ) s.t. (16), (17). (19)
We refer to a solution to P̃ as (x̃∗, t̃∗) and denote the seller’s value from problem P̃ by W̃ ∗.
3.3 Ex post information rents and revenue–irrelevance
A direct comparison of the cases with private and public shock allows us to study the role of
the privacy of ex post information in the design of the optimal mechanism. Clearly, a given
allocation rule x that is implementable with private shock is implementable with public shock,
and, moreover, the seller obtains a (weakly) higher revenue from implementing x when the
shock is public. If the seller can attain the same revenue when the shock is private, then the
seller does not need to leave any rent for eliciting the buyer’s ex post information when she
wants to implement x .
Moreover, comparing the values W ∗ and W̃ ∗ reveals how the privacy of the shock bears on
the seller’s ability to extract surplus. If the seller attains the same revenue when σ is private
as when σ is public information, then private ex post information is irrelevant in the sense
that it does not affect inefficiencies. These considerations motivate the following definitions.
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Definition 2 (a) Let x be implementable with private shock. We say that x is implementable
without ex post information rents if W (x) = W̃ (x).
(b) Private ex post information is said to be revenue-irrelevant if W ∗ = W̃ ∗.
Private ex post information may fail to be revenue–irrelevant for two reasons. First, the
allocation rule x̃∗ that is optimal with public shock may simply not be implementable with
private shock. Second, even if x̃∗ is implementable, it may not be implementable without ex
post information rents.
Esö and Szentes (2007a, b) have shown that if the model is continuous and x̃∗ is imple-
mentable with private shock, then private ex post information is revenue-irrelevant. As a
consequence, x̃∗ is implementable without ex post information rents. In what follows, we
generalize the result of Esö and Szentes (2007a, b) and show that in continuous models, any
allocation rule that is implementable with private shock is implementable without ex post in-
formation rents. More interestingly, we also show that this result is not true for discrete mod-
els. Indeed, in discrete models, an allocation rule that is implementable with private shock
is implementable without ex post information rents only in degenerate cases. This directly
implies that in discrete models, ex post information is revenue–irrelevant only in degenerate
cases. In particular, even if the allocation rule x̃∗ is implementable with private shock, ex post
information is typically not revenue-irrelevant.
To illustrate the basic features of our general analysis, we now analyze a discrete model
with two types and show that private ex post information is not revenue-irrelevant.
4 Two ex ante types
Let Θ = {θL,θH} be the set of the buyer’s ex ante types, occurring with P(θL) = 1 − p ∈
(0, 1) and P(θH) = p. To simplify notation, we replace the function arguments θL and θH by
appending function symbols with the subindices L and H. We assume that type θL corresponds
to the low valuation type and type θH to the high valuation type:
vL(σ) < vH(σ) ∀σ ∈ (0, 1). (20)
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4.1 Public shock
We begin by deriving the optimal selling mechanism with public shock. With two ex ante
types, a selling mechanism is a quadruple (x̃ , t̃) = (x̃ L(σ), t̃L(σ), x̃H(σ), t̃H(σ)), and the in-




{vH(σ)x̃H(σ)− t̃H(σ)} dσ ≥
∫ 1
0




{vL(σ)x̃ L(σ)− t̃L(σ)} dσ ≥
∫ 1
0








{vL(σ)x̃ L(σ)− t̃L(σ)} dσ ≥ 0. (24)
Standard arguments can be employed to show that at the optimal selling mechanism the
incentive constraint for the high valuation type and the participation constraint for the low
valuation type are binding and that the allocation rule has to satisfy a monotonicity property
with respect to the ex ante information.9
Lemma 2 With two ex ante types, the mechanism (x̃ , t̃)which is optimal with public shock maxi-




x̃ L(σ)] dσ ≥ 0.
















[vL(σ)− vH(σ)]x̃ L(σ) dσ. (26)














[vH(σ)− vL(σ)][ x̃H(σ)− x̃L(σ)] dσ ≥ 0 is a monotonicity condition because, as vH(σ)−
vL(σ)> 0 for all σ ∈ (0, 1), the condition is satisfied if x̃H(σ)≥ x̃L(σ) “on average”.
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To solve this problem, we can adopt the standard approach and first ignore the monotonicity
constraint (27). We then obtain the solution to this relaxed problem by point-wise maximiza-
tion. It is then easy to verify that the solution to the relaxed problem always satisfies the
monotonicity constraint so that it is also a solution to the original problem. We summarize
this in the next lemma.
Lemma 3 With two types, the solution (x̃∗, t̃∗) to problem P̃ is given by
x̃∗
H




0 i f vL(σ) < pvH(σ)
1 else.
(28)




are only pinned down in expectation by (25) and (26).
Thus, under the optimal mechanism with public shock, the high valuation type θH always
consumes the good (“no distortion at the top”), and the low valuation type θL consumes the










{vH(σ)− vL(σ)} dσ. (29)
4.2 Private shock
We now show that when the shock is private, the seller is strictly worse off than when the
shock is public. We derive this result by showing that, with private shock, the seller has to
concede to the buyer strictly more information rents if she wants to implement the same
allocation rule x̃∗ that is optimal with public shock. That is, x̃∗ is not implementable without
ex post information rents.
To prove our claim, we can use the following result from the literature: a deterministic
allocation rule10 is implementable with private shock if, and only if, two properties hold: first,
for each ex ante type, the allocation rule is non–decreasing in σ; second, if the allocation rule
prescribes consumption at a certain valuation for some ex ante type, then consumption is
prescribed at all higher valuations for all larger ex ante types.11,12 We now apply this result
to the allocation rule x̃∗ in (28). Note that the second requirement is trivially met since
10An allocation rule x is deterministic if x(θ ,σ) ∈ {0, 1} for all θ and σ.
11Formally: for θ < θ̂ , if x(θ ,σ) = 1, then x(θ̂ , σ̂) = 1 for all σ̂ with v(θ̂ , σ̂)≥ v(θ ,σ).
12The “if” part holds more generally also for non–deterministic allocation rules and was first proven in Courty












Lemma 4 The allocation rule x̃∗ in (28) is implementable with private shock if, and only if,
x̃∗
L
(σ) is non–decreasing in σ.
Hence, if x̃∗
L
is not non–decreasing, private ex post information is revenue–relevant for the
simple reason that the optimal allocation rule x̃∗ is not implementable with private shock.
More interestingly, we now show that even if x̃∗ is implementable with private shock, private
ex post information is not revenue-irrelevant. Therefore, we focus from now on on the case
that x̃∗
L
is monotone inσ. A sufficient condition for this is that the ratio vL(σ)/vH(σ) is strictly
increasing because this guarantees a unique solution σL to the equation vL(σL) = pvH(σL),
and (28) then prescribes the good to be sold to the low valuation buyer type whenever σ ≥
σL.
13 We now show that to implement x̃∗ with private shock, the seller has to concede a
higher information rent to the buyer than in the case with public shock.
Indeed, ex post incentive compatibility requires that the buyer type θL, after having re-
ported his ex ante information truthfully, reportsσ truthfully in the second stage. This implies
that the transfers tL are piece-wise constant, and that at the critical realization σL, the buyer















To see that ex post incentive compatibility implies these restrictions on the transfer schedule,
note that if tL were not constant on [0,σL), then since the allocation rule is constant on
[0,σL), there would be some realizations in [0,σL) for which the buyer would benefit from
reporting the value of σ that maximizes tL on [0,σL) instead of reporting his true value. For
the same reason, tL needs to be constant on [σL, 1]. On a related note, if the buyer were not
indifferent between consuming and not consuming the good at the value σL, but, say, strictly
preferred consumption, then he would still strictly prefer consumption at a value σ slightly
smaller than σL and would thus benefit from pretending to have observed σL in this case.




= vL(σL), but not the absolute mag-





as an exercise price at
13An example for which vL(σ)/vH(σ) is strictly increasing, is: vH(σ) = σ, and vL(σ) = σ
2.
14
which the buyer is allowed to buy the product after learning σ. Likewise, t0
L
corresponds to
an upfront payment by the buyer that gives him the option to make his consumption decision
after he has fully learned his valuation. Note that by adjusting the upfront payment t0
L
, while
keeping the exercise price fixed, the seller determines the buyer’s utility without affecting the








{vL(σ)− rL} dσ. (31)
Now observe that x̃∗
L
and the payments tL fully determine the high valuation buyer’s ex-
pected utility ULH when he pretends to be type θL. Since ex ante incentive compatibility
requires that the high valuation buyer attains at least a rent of ULH , we can now obtain a
lower bound on the rent that the seller has to concede to the buyer. To compute ULH , note
that after having reported θL, the buyer type θH exercises the option whenever




The key observation is that when the high valuation type θH reports θL, he exercises the option
more frequently than when the low valuation type θL reports θL. This is simply so because for
any realization σ of the shock, he displays a higher valuation than the buyer type θL. Hence,
for any value of σ so that vH(σ) > rL > vL(σ) the buyer type θH does, and the buyer type θL

























{vH(σ)− vL(σ)} dσ, (33)
where we have used (31) in the last line.
To obtain a lower bound on the rent the seller has to concede to the high valuation buyer,
note that ex ante incentive compatibility requires UH ≥ ULH and individual rationality requires








{vH(σ)− vL(σ)} dσ. (34)
14It may be shown that this lower bound is actually attainable.
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Now, reconsider the high valuation type’s rent when the shock σ is public. For the case that




{vH(σ)− vL(σ)} dσ. (35)
Comparing expression (34) to expression (35) makes clear that the buyer obtains an addi-
tional information rent from the privacy of the shock of
∆UH = UH − ŨH ≥
∫ σL
v−1H (rL)
{vH(σ)− rL} dσ. (36)
This expression also identifies the source of this additional rent. With public shock, the con-
tract enforces consumption directly, and irrespective of his true valuation, the buyer con-
sumes only for σ ≥ σL. In contrast, with private shock, the buyer effectively makes the
consumption decision himself. As a result of his higher valuation, the high valuation buyer
consumes the good more frequently than the low valuation buyer, and this is an additional
source of rents: relative to the low valuation buyer, the high valuation buyer obtains not only
the rent vH(σ)− vL(σ) whenever both buyer types decide to consume but he also gets the rent
vH(σ)− rL when the high valuation buyer does and the low valuation buyer does not decide
to consume ex post.
More generally, the transfers t̃∗ that prevent the buyer from lying when the shock is public
are not sufficient to prevent the buyer from lying when the shock is private. This is so because
when the shock is private, a lie about his ex ante information is more valuable to the buyer
since he can coordinate it with a lie about the shock. Put differently, while x̃∗ is implementable
with private shock “on the path”, it is not implementable with private shock “off the path” after
a lie by the high valuation buyer. Even though a lie by the buyer is a zero probability event,
the fact that the buyer can use his private ex post information to obtain a strictly higher utility
off the path relative to when the shock is public implies that the seller has to pay a higher rent
to prevent the buyer from lying than with public shock.
To see that the strictly higher rents imply that private ex post information is not revenue–
irrelevant, observe that x̃∗ is the unique optimal allocation rule when the shock is public.
Therefore, implementing any different allocation rule x∗ 6= x̃∗ yields a smaller payoff than
W̃ ∗ already with public shock. Because, as shown, x̃∗ requires the seller to pay larger rents
to the buyer, the seller’s revenue with private shock is smaller than W̃ ∗ so that private ex post
information is revenue–relevant.
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5 The general case
In this section, we generalize the findings for the two types case. We first provide a decom-
position of the buyer’s rent into ex ante and ex post information rent. This is the crucial step
to study the role of ex post information.
5.1 Ex ante and ex post information rents
We begin with two auxiliary lemmas. The first lemma states the well–known characterization
of ex post incentive compatibility (we omit the proof).
Lemma 5 The mechanism (x , t) is ex post incentive compatible if, and only if, u(θ ,σ) is abso-






x(θ ,σ) for almost all σ, (37)
x(θ ,σ) is non–decreasing in σ. (38)
We next characterize the buyer’s ex post reporting strategy. We define by
Γ
∗(θ , θ̂ ,σ) = argmax
σ̂
u(θ̂ , σ̂;θ ,σ) (39)
all optimal second stage reports by a buyer who has observed θ and σ and who has reported
θ̂ at the outset. The next lemma describes how the buyer optimally coordinates a lie about
his ex ante information with a lie about the shock. It says that a buyer type who has observed
θ and σ and who has reported θ̂ submits a “corrected” report σ∗ so that he has the same
valuation and ends up with the same utility as a buyer type who has observed θ̂ and σ∗ and
who has reported truthfully.
Lemma 6 If a mechanism is ex post incentive compatible, then there is a σ∗ = σ∗(θ , θ̂ ,σ) ∈
Γ
∗(θ , θ̂ ,σ) so that:
(a) v(θ ,σ) = v(θ̂ ,σ∗);
(b) u(θ̂ ,σ∗;θ ,σ) = u(θ̂ ,σ∗) =maxσ̂ u(θ̂ , σ̂;θ ,σ).
In light of the lemma, we can, without loss of generality, assume that a buyer who has
observed θ and σ and who has reported θ̂ at the outset, reports σ∗ = σ∗(θ , θ̂ ,σ) in the
second stage.
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We can now provide a decomposition of the buyer’s information rent in ex ante and ex
post rent. For an arbitrary allocation rule x , let
Rxa(θ , θ̂ , x) ≡
∫ 1
0
[v(θ ,σ)− v(θ̂ ,σ)]x(θ̂ ,σ) dσ; (40)
Rx p(θ , θ̂ , x) ≡
∫ 1
0
∫ σ∗(θ ,θ̂ ,σ)
σ
∂ v(θ̂ , c)
∂ σ
[x(θ̂ , c)− x(θ̂ ,σ)] dc dσ. (41)
Lemma 7 (a) A mechanism (x̃ , t̃) is incentive compatible with public shock if, and only if, for
all θ , θ̂ :
Ũ(θ )− Ũ(θ̂ ) ≥ Rxa(θ , θ̂ , x̃). (42)
(b) A mechanism (x , t) is incentive compatible with private shock if, and only if, (37) and (38)
are satisfied and for all θ , θ̂ , it holds:
U(θ )− U(θ̂ ) ≥ Rxa(θ , θ̂ , x) + Rx p(θ , θ̂ , x). (43)
Moreover, Rx p(θ , θ̂ , x)≥ 0, where the inequality is strict if x(θ̂ ,σ) is not constant in σ on (0, 1).
Lemma 7 provides, for both the case with private and public shock, lower bounds for the
information rents a buyer of type θ has to obtain so as not to pretend to be of type θ̂ . When
the shock is private, the lower bound can be decomposed into a part Rxa and a part Rx p. The
part Rxa is the same as the lower bound when ex post information is public and, therefore,
accrues from the buyer’s ex ante private information. Consequently, the part Rx p is the buyer’s
rent that accrues from observing the shock privately.
Figure 1 illustrates the decomposition graphically for the two types case and the allocation
rule x̃∗ given by (28) when x̃∗
L
is monotone. When the shock is public, the high valuation buyer
type θH can, by announcing type θ̂ = θL, secure himself the same utility as the low valuation
buyer plus the utility increment vH(σ)−vL(σ) he receives due to his higher valuation whenever
consumption is enforced by the mechanism with positive probability. To prevent type θH from
misreporting type θ̂ = θL, the seller needs to pay him at least a rent corresponding to the
expected utility increment, as expressed by Rxa. Because the allocation rule x̃∗ in the two type
case prescribes consumption exactly when σ exceeds the cutoff σL, the ex ante information
rent Rxa corresponds to the area in between the curves vH(σ) and vL(σ) over the range σL to














Figure 1: Ex ante vs. ex post information rents.
When the shock is private, the high valuation buyer can increase his utility from a mis-
report θ̂ = θL by combining it with a misreport σ̂ about the shock that induces his most
preferred allocation x(θ̂ , σ̂) that is available ex post. This additional source of rent is cap-
tured by the term Rx p. The ex post information rent is strictly positive if, conditional on the
first report θ̂ , the allocation is responsive to the second report σ̂. Only in this case, there
are realizations of σ so that the high valuation buyer can exploit the privacy of the shock to
induce a better allocation for himself than the allocation that is enforced when σ is public.
Note that the allocation rule x̃∗ with two ex ante types θH and θL is responsive, as it prescribes
consumption only if σ exceeds σL. As illustrated in Figure 1 this leads to a strictly positive
ex post information rent Rx p. It corresponds to the area between vH(σ) and vL(σL) over the
range from σ∗ to σL, because exactly for these realization of σ a high valuation type would
obtain a utility increase of vH(σ)− vL(σL) by reporting σ > σL in comparison to reporting σ
truthfully and ending up with no consumption.
We now use the decomposition to study the relevance of ex post information. We show
that ex post information does not give rise to additional rents and is revenue–irrelevant in
continuous models, but for discrete models this is true only in the degenerate case that the
allocation is not responsive to the second report σ̂ for the lowest type θ .
5.2 Continuous model
We first show that for continuous models, the information rents are the same with public and
















Figure 2: Quadratic reduction of Rx p vs. linear reduction of Rxa.




Rx p(θ +δ,θ , x)
δ
= 0. (44)
(b) Moreover, if x is implementable with private shock, then Ũ and U are absolutely continuous
and thus differentiable for almost all θ ∈ Θ, and whenever the derivatives exist, it holds:
Ũ ′(θ ) = U ′(θ )≥ 0. (45)
The reason for why the marginal ex post information rent disappears can be intuitively
seen as follows. The ex post information rent of a high valuation buyer relative to a low
valuation buyer is essentially the product of two factors: the valuation increment and the
probability with which the high valuation buyer benefits from misrepresenting the shock σ
when he pretended to be the low valuation buyer. As the distance between the two ex ante
types diminishes, both of these factors go to zero, because the valuation difference diminishes,
and, crucially, because the set of realizationsσ for which a misreport is still beneficial becomes
smaller and smaller. Therefore, as the distance between ex ante types goes to zero, the ex
post rent converges to zero at a quadratic speed.
In contrast, the ex ante rent converges to zero only at a linear speed, because only the
difference in valuations diminishes, but the probability with which consumption is enforced
by the mechanism does not diminish as the distance between ex ante types diminishes.
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Figure 2 illustrates this graphically. As a result of introducing an additional intermediate ex
ante type θM , the area R
x p shrinks both in the vertical dimension, because the difference in the
valuations between type θL and the next higher type θM becomes smaller, and in the horizontal
dimension, because when having announced to be type θ̂ = θL, type θM manipulates the
shock σ for a smaller range of shocks than type θH . In contrast, the area R
xa shrinks only in
the vertical dimension, because the probability with which the contract enforces consumption
upon an announcement of type θ̂ = θL does not change by the introduction of the intermediate
type θM .
To complete the argument for why ex post information rents are zero in continuous mod-
els, notice that since Ũ ′(θ ) = U ′(θ ) ≥ 0, both with public and private shock, the individual
rationality constraints (12) and (17) are met if, and only if, they are met for the lowest val-
uation type θ . Therefore, both with public and private shock, the revenue maximizing way
for the seller to implement an allocation rule is to have the individual rationality constraint
for the lowest type binding: Ũ(θ ) = U(θ ) = 0. Because Ũ ′(θ ) = U ′(θ ), and since Ũ and U
are absolutely continuous, the buyer’s utility is consequently the same with public and private
shock, establishing our first main result:
Proposition 1 Suppose the model is continuous. Then it holds:
(a) Any allocation rule x that is implementable with private shock, is implementable without ex
post information rents.
(b) (Esö and Szentes (2007a, b)) If x̃∗ is implementable with private shock, ex post information
is revenue–irrelevant.
Part (a) of the proposition says that when the model is continuous, the agent never gets
any information rents from his ex post information. This extends Esö and Szentes (2007a, b)
who show this result only with respect to the allocation rule that is optimal when the shock
is public, as stated in part (b). In particular, if revenue–irrelevance fails in the continuous
model, then it fails for implementability reasons, not because the principal has to concede
more rents with private than with a public shock.
5.3 Discrete model
We now turn to the discrete model and show that, only in rather special cases, ex post infor-
mation does not increase the agent’s rent. Recall that (x∗, t∗) is an the optimal mechanism
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with private shock.
Proposition 2 Suppose the model is discrete. Then it holds:
(a) Any allocation rule x that is implementable with private shock is implementable without
information rents only if x(θ ,σ) is constant in σ on (0, 1).
(b) Ex post information is revenue–irrelevant only if x∗(θ ,σ) is constant in σ on (0, 1).
To understand the result, note that if x(θ ,σ) is not constant in σ, then Lemma 7b implies
that the implementation of x with private shock requires that all types larger than θ are paid
a strictly positive ex post rent Rx p in order to prevent them from claiming to be type θ . By
Lemma 7a, when the shock is public, the seller can dispense with these extra rents when
implementing x and only pay the ex ante rents Rxa to the buyer. This applies to any x that is
implementable with private shock and, in particular, for x∗. Hence, the seller can implement
the optimal allocation x∗ with strictly smaller information rents when the shock is public. This
means that ex post information is not revenue-irrelevant in discrete models.
For sequential screening models with discrete ex ante types where the so called first order
approach works15, it is generally known that the optimal sequential mechanism, for any ex
ante type θ , prescribes consumption and hence does not display a distortion for the most
efficient ex post type σ = 1 (see, e.g., Courty and Li, 2000 or Battaglini, 2005).16 In this case,
we can strengthen Proposition 2b by stating that ex post information is revenue–irrelevant
only if the optimal mechanism implements the efficient outcome where the buyer always
consumes the good so that there are no distortions.
Finally we point out that our result that ex post information rents are strictly positive
does not require a shock that is a continuous random variable. Ex post information rents
arise whenever the buyer’s optimal report about the shock depends on his true (and not only
on his reported) ex ante type. As we have shown, this is always the case when the ex ante
information is discrete and the ex post shock is continuous, but, depending on the shock
distribution, this is also the case if the shock is discrete. To illustrate, consider a setting with
two ex ante types and two possible shocks, favorable (σ+) and unfavorable (σ−). We can
then distinguish two cases. In the first case, final valuations “overlap”. This means that the
15This means that only the “local” incentive compatibility constraints are binding at the optimum.
16There are good reasons to conjecture that this is a general property of optimal sequential mechanisms in
any context, but proving this conjecture would go beyond the scope of this paper.
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valuation of the buyer with the high ex ante type and the unfavorable shock is smaller than the
valuation of the buyer with the low ex ante type and the favorable shock: vH(σ
−) ≤ vL(σ
+).
In this case, it can be shown that ex post rents are zero under the optimal selling schedule and
therefore ex post information is revenue–irrelevant.17 In the other case, final valuations “do
not overlap”: vH(σ
−) > vL(σ
+). In this case, when the high ex ante type buyer lies ex ante,
he will always report a favorable shock ex post, because irrespective of the true shock his true
valuation is even higher than the valuation of the buyer with the low valuation type and the
favorable shock and therefore he prefers the terms of trade for this type rather than for the
buyer with the low ex ante type and the unfavorable shock. Consequently, when valuations
do not overlap, ex post information rents are typically positive. Hence, with discrete shocks,
ex post information rents are, in general, also strictly positive.
6 Disclosure of ex post information
In this section, we show that our findings have relevant implications for the seller’s incentives
to disclose ex post information to the buyer. As observed already by Esö and Szentes (2007a,
b), when ex post private information is revenue–irrelevant, it is optimal for the seller to fully
disclose the shock even if the buyer observes it privately. This is because the seller can extract
the full value of the disclosed ex post information as if this information was publicly observ-
able. We now show that full disclosure of the shock is, in fact, not optimal in general. We
provide an example of a discrete model in which there exists a partial disclosure policy that
allows the seller to attain the same revenue W̃ ∗ as when the shock is public. Hence, under
the partial disclosure rule, the ex post private information is revenue-irrelevant, which, as we
have seen in Section 4, is not the case under full disclosure.
We reconsider the model with two types from Section 4 and assume that the buyer can
only observe the ex ante information θ , but that the extent of the ex post information the
buyer observes is controlled by the seller. More specifically, as in Esö and Szentes (2007a, b),
we assume that the seller can disclose to the buyer, without observing herself, the realization
of any signal that is correlated with the shock σ. In particular, the seller may adopt a “binary”
17See Pavan (2007) who presents a general version of this “overlapping” condition (Condition 3, page 23)
and shows that this implies the irrelevance result of Esö and Szentes (2007a). Boleslavsky and Said (2013)
show for a dynamic screening problem with binomial shock distribution satisfying an overlapping condition that
preventing the buyer from misrepresenting his type in a single period is sufficient for truth–telling in any period.
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disclosure rule which reveals to the buyer only whether the shock is below or above some
cutoff valueσ0. We now consider a specific example in which there is such a partial disclosure
rule which allows the seller to attain the revenue W̃ ∗. Let
vL(σ) = σ
2, vH(σ) = σ. (46)
By Lemma 3, the optimal mechanism with public shock for specification (46) is given by
the monotone allocation rule
x̃∗
H




0 i f σ < p
1 else,
(47)










[vL(σ)− vH(σ)] dσ. (48)
Now suppose that the seller commits to a partial disclosure mechanism that reveals to the
buyer ex post only whether the shock is below or above the cutoff value σ0 = p. In addition,
she offers the buyer the following menu of option contracts:
• By announcing type θH , the buyer pays the price t̄H and receives the good for sure.
• By announcing the type θL, the buyer receives the right to buy the good at a price rL =
t̄L/(1−σ0) after having learned the additional information.
We claim that this partial disclosure mechanism implements the allocation rule x̃∗ and
yields the seller the revenue W̃ ∗. More precisely, we show that, under the partial disclosure
role, the high valuation buyer does no longer benefit from a lie ex post after having lied
initially. In other words, the menu of option contracts does not only implement the allocation
rule x̃∗ “on the path”, after the buyer has announced his type θ truthfully, but also “off the
path”, after a lie by the buyer. Note that if this is true, then, on the path, the high valuation
buyer consumes the good with probability 1, inducing the payment t̄H for sure, and the low
valuation buyer consumes the good with probability P[σ > σ0] = 1−σ0, inducing expected
payments t̄L. Therefore, not only the allocation rule, but also the expected payments under
the partial disclosure mechanism are the same as under the optimal mechanism with publicly
observable σ. This directly implies that the partial disclosure mechanism is ex ante incentive
compatible and individually rational and yields the seller the same revenue as the optimal
mechanism with public shock.
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To see that the partial disclosure mechanism implements x̃∗ on and off the path, observe
first that after an announcement θH , the good is consumed with probability 1 no matter which
buyer type made the announcement. Next consider what happens after an announcement θL,
and take first the case that the low valuation buyer has made this announcement. Observe
that the exercise price rL exactly matches the expected valuation of the low valuation buyer
when he learns that σ exceeds σ0:









It is therefore optimal for the low valuation buyer θL to exercise the option if, and only if, he
learns that σ exceeds σ0.
Next, consider the case that the high valuation buyer announced θL. Since vH(σ) > vL(σ)
for σ ∈ (0, 1), it follows E[vH(σ)|σ > σ0] > E[vL(σ)|σ > σ0] = rL, and thus the high
valuation buyer exercises the option when he learns that σ > σ0. On the other hand, when
he learns that σ < σ0, then using (46), his expected payoff is
E[vH(σ)|σ < σ0]− t̄L/(1−σ0) = σ0/2− (1−σ
3
0
)/(3− 3σ0) = −(2σ
2
0
−σ0 + 2)/6 < 0.(50)
The inequality follows because the expression attains a maximum of −5/16 at σ0 = 1/4.
This shows that the partial disclosure mechanism implements x̃∗ on and off the path, and,
as a result, the seller obtains the expected revenue W̃ ∗. As shown in Section 4, this is more
than what the seller can obtain under full disclosure, and therefore partial disclosure is strictly
optimal.
Intuitively, partial disclosure eliminates the ex post information rent, because it affects the
way how the buyer uses his ex post information. Even though the high valuation buyer, after
having announced θL, is still free to misrepresent the shock, the disclosure policy is designed
so that it is no longer optimal for the buyer to do so, but rather to choose the same allocation
that would be enforced when the shock were public. In this case, ex post information does
not yield additional rents.
That there is a disclosure rule that implements the same outcome as if the shock was
public, is a special feature of our example. On a more general note, restricting the ex post
information available to the buyer has two countervailing effects. On the one hand, it reduces
ex post information rents, as it diminishes the value from misrepresenting ex post information
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off the path. On the other hand, it also reduces the set of allocations that can be implemented
on the path. We conjecture that, unlike in our example, there is in general no disclosure rule
that fully resolves this trade–off and permits the seller to attain W̃ ∗.
The effect that revealing less information reduces information rents and may therefore be
beneficial to the seller, is reminiscent of a general insight in mechanism design that "revealing
more information to players makes it harder to prevent them from finding ways to gain by
lying" (Myerson 1991, p.297) so that one should reveal "to each player only the minimum
information needed to guide his action" (Myerson 1991, p.260). Indeed in our example, re-
vealing only whetherσ is larger or smaller thanσ0 = p is the minimum amount of information
revelation that is needed to implement the allocation rule. Disclosing more information only
makes it more difficult to satisfy incentive compatibility, leading to higher implementation
costs in the form of positive ex post information rents.
We close this section by clarifying the relationship between our partial disclosure result
and a recent partial disclosure result by Li and Shi (2013). Li and Shi (2013) consider a seller
who can disclose, without observing herself, information not about the shock but about the
final valuation v and show that in this case, partial disclosure might be optimal, even in the
continuous setting of Esö and Szentes (2007a, b). Effectively, when the seller can disclose
information about the final valuation, she can choose from a larger set of disclosure policies
than when she can disclose information only about the shock. Imagine that in our example,
the seller wanted to disclose to the buyer whether his valuation v is larger than 1/4. This
information cannot be disclosed by disclosure of the shock alone, because the seller would
need to disclose to the high valuation buyer whether vH(σ) = σ > 1/4, i.e. whether the shock
is larger than 1/4, but to the low valuation buyer the seller would need to disclose whether
vL(σ) = σ
2 > 1/4, i.e. whether the shock is larger than 1/2. For this larger class of disclosure
policies, Li and Shi (2013) show that not only full disclosure of v may be suboptimal but also
that there can be partial disclosure policies that allow the seller to obtain a higher revenue
than in the benchmark of Esö and Szentes (2007a, b).
7 Conclusion
In this paper we show that, in general, a principal has to pay information rents for inducing
an agent to reveal his private ex post information in excess of the rents that she needs to
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pay for eliciting the agent’s private ex ante information. We interpret these additional rents
as ex post information rents. The principal has to pay such rents, because in their absence
the agent would benefit from coordinating his ex ante and ex post lies. The agent’s potential
benefits from such coordinated lying are strictly positive when the ex ante private information
is discrete and the ex post private information is continuous. In such a model, the classical
trade-off between rents and efficiency is more subtle, because the rents consist of both ex ante
and ex post information rents.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: (a) The claim follows directly from the assumption that F(v|θ ) first order
stochastically dominates F(v|θ ) for θ > θ̂ .
(b) The claim follows from the non–shifting support assumption, and because F(v|θ ) is
strictly increasing and continuous in v for all θ ∈ Θ.
(c) Existence of ∂ v(θ ,σ)/∂ σ follows because F has a density f . In particular, ∂ v(θ ,σ)/∂ σ =
1/ f (v(θ ,σ)|θ ) is strictly positive and bounded because f (v,θ ) is strictly positive and bounded
away from zero.
(d) Finally, if the model is continuous, then ∂ F(v|θ )/∂ θ exists and, because in addition
f (v|θ )> 0, we can apply the implicit function theorem to obtain ∂ v(θ ,σ)/∂ θ by differenti-

















Boundedness of ∂ v(θ ,σ)/∂ θ follows because ∂ F(v|θ )/∂ θ is bounded and f (v|θ ) is bounded
away from zero. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Adding up (ICH) and (ICL) and re–arranging yields:
∫ 1
0
[vH(σ)− vL(σ)][x̃H(σ)− x̃ L(σ)] dσ ≥ 0. (52)
Moreover, (ICH) and (IRL) imply (IRH) because of (20). Therefore, (IRH) can be ignored,
and it follows that at the optimum, (IRL) and (ICH) are binding, because otherwise, without
affecting any other constraint, the expected transfers to type θL could be reduced until (IRL)
binds, and the expected transfers to type θH could be reduced until (ICH) binds. Since (ICH)
is binding, (52) implies
∫ 1
0
t̃L(σ)− t̃H(σ) dσ =
∫ 1
0
vH(σ)[x̃ L(σ)− x̃H(σ)] dσ ≤
∫ 1
0
vL(σ)[x̃ L(σ)− x̃H(σ)], (53)
but this inequality is the same as (ICL). Hence, also (ICL) can be ignored, and the claim
follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3 Follows directly from the main text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4 Follows directly from the main text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5 Standard and therefore omitted. Q.E.D.
28
Proof of Lemma 6 By Lemma 1b, there is a unique σ∗ so that v(θ ,σ∗) = v(θ̂ ,σ∗). If type θ
has reported type θ̂ and observed σ, he chooses σ̂ to maximize
v(θ ,σ)x(θ̂ , σ̂)− t(θ̂ , σ̂) = v(θ̂ ,σ∗)x(θ̂ , σ̂)− t(θ̂ , σ̂). (54)
By ex post incentive compatibility for type θ̂ , the report σ̂ = σ∗ maximizes the right hand
side of (54). Thus, σ∗ is an optimal report in the second stage when type θ has reported type
θ̂ and observed σ.
To see (b), note that because of (a), we have
u(θ̂ ,σ∗;θ ,σ) = v(θ ,σ)x(θ̂ ,σ∗)− t(θ̂ ,σ∗) = v(θ̂ ,σ∗)x(θ̂ ,σ∗)− t(θ̂ ,σ∗) = u(θ̂ ,σ∗). (55)
This shows the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7 (a) Immediate from (15) and (16).
(b) By Lemma 5, it is sufficient to show that ex ante incentive compatibility (11) is equiv-




Hence, ex ante incentive compatibility (11) is equivalent to





u(θ̂ , σ̂;θ ,σ) dσ−
∫ 1
0


















∂ v(θ̂ , c)
∂ σ
x(θ̂ , c) dc dσ, (59)
where the first equality follows from Lemma 6b and the final equality follows from Lemma 5.
Moreover, by Lemma 6a, we have that
Rxa(θ , θ̂ , x) =
∫ 1
0










∂ v(θ̂ , c)
∂ σ
x(θ̂ ,σ) dc dσ. (62)
Adding the last term to Rx p(θ , θ̂ , x) yields expression (59), and hence, (43) holds.
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Moreover, to see that Rx p(θ , θ̂ , x) is positive, observe thatσ ≷ σ∗(θ , θ̂ ,σ)⇔ θ ≶ θ̂ for all
σ ∈ (0, 1) by (3) and Lemma 6a. Hence, since ∂ v/∂ σ is positive by Lemma 1c, and x(θ̂ ,σ)
is non–decreasing in σ according to Lemma 5, Rx p is positive.
Finally, suppose that x(θ̂ ,σ) is not constant in σ on (0, 1), and consider the case θ > θ̂ .
(The case θ < θ̂ can be treated analogously.) Then, because x(θ̂ ,σ) is non–decreasing in
σ according to Lemma 5, there exist 0 < σ1 < σ
′
2












Because x(θ̂ ,σ) is not constant on the open interval (σ1,σ
′
2
), we have that σ1 < σ2. Let
∆σ = min
σ∈[σ1,σ2]
σ∗(θ , θ̂ ,σ)−σ. (64)
Note that ∆σ exists and, since θ > θ̂ and 0< σ1 < σ2 < 1, we have ∆σ > 0.
Now let
σ0 = σ2 − 1/2 ·∆σ. (65)
Then, by definition of σ2, we have for all σ ∈ [σ0,σ2) that σ < σ2 and σ+∆σ > σ2 so that
∫ σ+∆σ
σ










∂ v(θ̂ , c)
∂ σ
> 0, (68)
which is strictly positive by Lemma 1c.
Applying these properties together with x(θ̂ ,σ) being non–decreasing in σ, we can infer:
Rx p(θ , θ̂ , x) =
∫ 1
0
∫ σ∗(θ ,θ̂ ,σ)
σ
∂ v(θ̂ , c)
∂ σ




∫ σ∗(θ ,θ̂ ,σ)
σ
∂ v(θ̂ , c)
∂ σ






[x(θ̂ , c)− x(θ̂ ,σ)] dc dσ > 0. (71)
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where the final inequality follows from (67). This shows that Rx p(θ , θ̂ , x) > 0 if x(θ̂ ,σ) is
not constant in σ on (0, 1) and completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 8 (a) Note that σ∗(θ ,θ ,σ) = σ. Hence,
lim
δ→0












∂ v(θ , c)
∂ σ
[x(θ , c)− x(θ ,σ)] dc

 dσ, (72)
because we can interchange integration and taking the limit since all functions are bounded.
Now observe that because the model is continuous, we have, by (6), that v(θ ,σ) is differ-
entiable in θ , and thus Lemma 6a, implies that σ∗(θ , θ̂ ,σ) is differentiable in θ . Hence, by
Leibniz’ rule, the term in the square bracket in (72) is equal to
∂ v(θ ,σ∗(θ +δ,θ ,σ))
∂ σ
[x(θ ,σ∗(θ + δ,θ ,σ))− x(θ ,σ)] ·








because x(θ ,σ∗(θ + δ,θ ,σ))|δ=0 = x(θ ,σ
∗(θ ,θ ,σ)) = x(θ ,σ) so that the difference in the
squared brackets in (73) is zero, and this shows part (a).
(b) To see absolute continuity, note first that for an arbitrary function φ(ẑ; z) for which







|φ(ẑ; z1)−φ(ẑ; z2)|. (74)
As absolute continuity is implied by Lipschitz continuity, it is sufficient to show that U and Ũ
are Lipschitz continuous. To see the Lipschitz continuity of Ũ , observe that incentive compat-
ibility, (16), implies Ũ(θ ) =maxθ̂ Ũ(θ̂ ;θ ), and hence by (74),
|Ũ(θ1)− Ũ(θ2)| ≤ max
θ̂

























































|θ1 − θ2|, (79)
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where the second line follows from the definition of Ũ in (15), the third line from x(θ̂ ,σ) ≤ 1,
and the final lines from standard estimations and the fact that ∂ v/∂ θ is bounded by Lemma
1d. This proves that Ũ is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant maxθ̃ ,σ |∂ v(θ̃ ,σ)/∂ θ |.





u(θ̂ , σ̂;θ2,σ)| ≤max
σ̂
|u(θ̂ , σ̂;θ1,σ)− u(θ̂ , σ̂;θ2,σ)|. (80)
By incentive compatibility, (11), we have U(θ ) =maxθ̂ U(θ̂ ;θ ), and, by definition, U(θ̂ ;θ ) =
∫ 1
0
maxσ̂ u(θ̂ , σ̂;θ ,σ). Hence, applying again (74) and then (80), we obtain
|U(θ1)− U(θ2)| ≤ max
θ̂


















|v(θ1,σ)− v(θ2,σ)| dσ, (84)
where the third line follows from the definition of u in (8), and the last line from the fact
that x(θ̂ , σ̂) ≤ 1. The same steps as in the previous paragraph now imply that U is Lipschitz
continuous.
Since U and Ũ are Lipschitz, they are absolutely continuous, and thus differentiable almost
everywhere. Consider θ ∈ Θ at which Ũ ′ exists. Then, by Lemma 7a:
Ũ ′(θ ) = lim
δ→0











x(θ ,σ) dσ, (85)
and
Ũ ′(θ ) = lim
δ→0












x(θ ,σ) dσ, (86)
where the limits on the right hand side exist, because ∂ v(θ ,σ)/∂ θ exists and is bounded.
The two inequalities imply that





x(θ ,σ) dσ. (87)
With analogous reasoning, we can deduce by Lemma 7b that for all θ ∈ Θ at which U ′ exists,
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we have
U ′(θ ) = lim
δ→0
1/δ · Rxa(θ +δ,θ , x) + lim
δ→0






x(θ ,σ) dσ+ 0, (89)
where the final equality follows from part (a). Hence we have shown that Ũ ′(θ ) = U ′(θ )
for all θ ∈ Θ at which the derivatives exist. Moreover, since ∂ v/∂ θ ≥ 0 by Lemma 1a, the
derivatives are positive. This completes the proof of part (b). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1 Follows directly from the main text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 Note that (b) directly follows from (a) with x = x∗. Hence, we only
show (a). If x is implementable with private shock, then there exists a transfer schedule t







t̂(θ ,σ) dσ dP(θ ). (90)
We now show that if x(θ ,σ) is not constant in σ on (0, 1), then W (x) < W̃ (x), which im-
plies that x is not implementable without ex post information rents. We prove this result by











Rx p(θ ,θ , x). (92)
For the discrete model, Θ is finite and, therefore, the minimum exists. Since x(θ ,σ) is not




t̂(θ ,σ) if θ = θ
t̂(θ ,σ) + R otherwise.
(93)
Clearly, t̃ satisfies (91). In order to show that (x , t̃) is also feasible with public shock, let Ũ(θ )
be the expected utility of buyer type θ from the mechanism (x , t̃) when he truthfully reports
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his type θ , and σ is publicly observable, as defined after equation (15). Likewise, let U(θ ) be
the expected utility of buyer type θ from the mechanism (x , t̂) when he truthfully reports his
type θ , and σ is privately observable, as defined after equation (10). By construction of the
payments, we have
Ũ(θ ) = U(θ )− R ∀s 6= θ , Ũ(θ ) = U(θ ). (94)
We now show that (x , t̃) is incentive compatible with public shock. Indeed, since (x , t̂) is
incentive compatible with private shock, Lemma 7b, implies for all θ 6= θ , θ̂ 6= θ ,
Ũ(θ )− Ũ(θ̂ ) = U(θ )− U(θ̂ )≥ Rxa(θ , θ̂ , x̃) + Rx p(θ , θ̂ , x̃) ≥ Rxa(θ , θ̂ , x̃), (95)
and for all θ 6= θ ,
Ũ(θ )− Ũ(θ ) = U(θ )− U(θ )− R≥ Rxa(θ ,θ , x̃) + Rx p(θ ,θ , x̃)− R≥ Rxa(θ ,θ , x̃), (96)
and for all θ̂ 6= θ ,
Ũ(θ )− Ũ(θ̂ ) = U(θ )− U(θ̂ ) + R≥ Rxa(θ , θ̂ , x̃) + Rx p(θ , θ̂ , x̃) + R≥ Rxa(θ , θ̂ , x̃). (97)
Hence, Ũ satisfies the inequalities in Lemma 7a, and thus (x , t̃) is incentive compatible with
public shock.
It remains to show that (x , t̃) is individually rational with public shock. Indeed, since (x , t̂)
is individually rational with private shock, we have Ũ(θ ) = U(θ ) ≥ 0. Since we established
in the proof of Lemma 8b that Ũ(θ ) is increasing in θ whenever the mechanism is incentive
compatible with public shock, we have Ũ(θ ) ≥ Ũ(θ ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ so that (x , t̃) is
individually rational. And this completes the proof. Q.E.D.
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